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PROFESSIONAL ATHLETIC CONTRACTS
AND THE INJUNCTIVE DILEMMA
INTRODUCTION

Professional sports' have always been considered as big
business. Originally, they were deemed local in nature, 2 but
presently they are defined as interstate commerce. 3 Courts
from all jurisdictions have recognized that professional sports
are businesses of such a unique and peculiar nature 4 that liberties and privileges are granted to their owners which legally
are dubious, if not invalid. 5 The foundation of the professional
sports business is built upon a standard player contract 6 which
is signed by the respective club and the athlete. This founda7
tion is rarely challenged due to the monopolistic control
wielded by the respective sport. But the athlete who breaches
his contract and attempts to play for another club presents a
major threat to the very existence of this foundation." The
breaching athlete not only is in derogation of the standard
player contract, but from the sport entrepreneur's vantage
point, he is an anarchist, capable of disrupting the gold mine
which the owner enjoys. Therefore, the owners do not merely
desire money damages for the breach, but they seek remedies
which will prevent such acts of insurrection. Hence, the clubs'
chief weapon in their arsenal of remedies9 against the breach1. The term "professional sports" will be used to denote team sports.
Any reference made to an individual sport will be specifically noted.

2. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).
3. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1971); Haywood v. Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1970); Radovich v. Nat'l Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101
F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952).
4. Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 879 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
5. Note, Baseball and the Law-Yesterday and Today, 32 ViR. L.
REv. 1164, 1168 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Baseball].
6. The standard player contract is used by every team. The league
rules provide that every team must use this and no other contract. It
is a method of control and uniformity.
7. Baseball, supra note 5, at 1173-75.
8. Although a player might breach the contract at any time during
its term, the breach occurs during the option year in most situations.
Hereinafter, references to breaches will pertain to option year breaches
unless otherwise specified.
9. The National Basketball Association Uniform Player Contract,
clause 9, is representative for all sports of the vast number of remedies
a club has:
9. The Player represents and agrees that he has extraordinary
and unique skill and ability as a basketball player, that the services
to be rendered by him hereunder cannot be placed or the loss thereof
adequately compensated for in money damages, and that any breach
by the Player of this contract will cause irreparable injury to the
Club and to its assignees. Therefore, it is agreed that in the event
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ing athlete is an injunction obtained to enforce the negative
covenant' ° in the contract.
The purpose of this article will be to examine the jurisdictional requirements for securing such relief, the discretionary
considerations confronting a court after jurisdiction is, established, and the question of whether or not the present basis
for granting such relief comply with the equitable philosophy
it was founded upon. It is the contention of this author that
such relief neither complies with the equitable policies it was
founded upon, nor does it adequately protect the legal rights of
the parties. Therefore, in most instances, injunctive relief
should not be granted.
THE BASIS OF EQUITY JURISDICTION

Historically, courts of equity have refused to order specific
performance of personal service contracts, either directly 1 ' or
indirectly, by injunction. 1 2 Notwithstanding their refusal to
order specific performance of a breached affirmative promise,
in the landmark case of Lumley v. Wagner,'3 a court of equity
enjoined the breach of a negative promise.
In Lumley, the defendant promised to sing at the plaintiff's
theatre for a specified period of time and not to perform for
anyone else during that term. When the uniquely talented defendant attempted to sing at another theatre, the plaintiff
sought injunctive relief in the Chancery Court. Lord St. Leonit is alleged by the Club that the Player is playing, attempting or
threatening to play, or negotiating for the purpose ot playing, during

the term of this contract, for any other person, firm, corporation or
organization, the Club and its assignees (in addition to any other
remedies that may be available to them judicially or by way of arbitration) shall have the right to obtain from any court or arbitrator
having jurisdiction, such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including a decree enjoining the player from any further such breach
of this contract, and enjoining the Player from playing basketball
for any other person, firm, corporation or organization during the
term of this contract. In any suit, action or arbitration proceeding
brought to obtain such relief, the Player does hereby waive his right,
if any, to trial by jury, and does hereby waive his right, if any, to
interpose any counterclaim or set-off for any cause whatever.
10. The Uniform Players Contract-The American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, clause 5 (a) provides:
Service
5. (a) The Player agrees that, while under contract, and prior to expiration of the Club's right to renew this contract, he will not play
aseball otherwise than for the Club, except that the Player may
participate in post-season games, under the conditions prescribed in
the Major League Rules. Major League Rule 18(b) is set forth
herein.
11. See, e.g., DeRivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige 264 (N.Y. 1833);
Stocker v. Brocklebank, 3 McN.&G. 250 (Eng. 1851); Ball v. Coggs,
Brown's Park, Case 140 (Eng. 1710).
12. See, e.g., Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 339 (1870);
Ulrey v. Keith, 237 Ill. 284 (1908); Welty v. Jacobs, 171 Ill. 624 (1898).
13. 1 De G. M. & G. 604 (Eng. 1852).
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ards enjoined the defendant from engaging in the conflicting
employment, but he refused to order her to perform for the
plaintiff.
Prior to this decision, the breach of a negative covenant
would be enjoined only if the injunctive relief provided complete performance of the contract. 1 4 But the court in Lumley
liberalized the use of injunctive relief by granting an injunction to remedy the breach of a negative covenant although
there also existed a breached positive covenant which could not
be remedied by the court. 1 5 In effect, Lumley expanded
equity jurisdiction in England, and McCaull v. Braham'6 had
7
the same impact in America.1
In 1890, this concept of expanded jurisdiction was applied,
for the first time, in cases involving professional athletes. 8
The extension of Lumley in these cases was logical, since
[b]etween an actor of great histrionic ability and a professional
baseball player, of peculiar fitness and skill to fill a particular
position, no substantial distinction in applying the Rule laid down
. . . can be made. Each is sought for his particular and peculiar
fitness, each performs in public for compensation, and each possesses for the manager a means of attracting an audience.' 9
However, the initial problem confronting the court when a
sports club seeks injunctive relief against its breaching athlete
is whether the facts satisfy the jurisdictional requirements announced by Lumley.
THE

BASTARDIZATION

OF

Lumley

The elements set forth by the Lumley court were premised upon the philosophy that an injunction is an extraordinary
form of relief which should be granted only in exceptional circumstances. These elements are:
1) Unique services,
14. See, e.g., Hamblin v. Dinneford, 2 Edw. Ch. 529 (N.Y. 1935);
Burton v. Marshall, 4 Gill 487 (Md. 1846); Kimberly v. Jennings, 6 Sim.
340 (Eng. 1836); Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333 (Eng. 1829); Clarke v.
Price, 2 Wilson's Ch. 157 (Eng. 1819); Ashley, Specific Performanec by
Injunction,6 COLUM. L. REV. 82 (1906).
15. 1 De G. M. & G. 604 (Eng. 1852).
16. 16 F. 37 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
17. Although Lumley became the law, it was not universally ac-

cepted. Vicious criticism against such expansion was espoused by legal
scholars, see, e.g., Ashley, supra note 14; Stevens, Involuntary Servitude
by Injunction, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 235 (1921). and by some courts. see, e.g.,
Harrisburg Base-Ball Club v. Athletic Ass'n, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 337 (1890).
18. See, e.g., Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198
(C.C.N.Y. 1890); Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 24 Abb. N. Cas.
393, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Philadelphia Ball Club v. Hallman,
8 Pa. Co. Ct. 57 (Ct. of Common Pleas 1890).
19. Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 24 Abb. N. Cas. 393, 410,
9 N.Y.S. 779, 780 (Sup. Ct. 1890).

440

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 8:437

2) An inadequate remedy at law,
3) A valid personal service contract, and
4) A negative covenant within the contract.
The valid personal service contract and negative covenant
elements will not be discussed, inasmuch as both of these requirements no longer present jurisdictional problems, since the
club and the athlete sign a standard player contract which satisfies these elements. The uniqueness and adequacy elements
will be analyzed to illustrate the initial standards that had to
be fulfilled before jurisdiction was established, and the deterioration of them by the courts.
Uniqueness
A contract to render personal service exclusively for one employer will not be indirectly enforced by injunction against serving another person if, .

20

d) the service is not unique or extra-

ordinary in character.
The rationale behind the uniqueness requirement is that
damages at law will be adequate if the player possesses merely
average skills, but inadequate if the player is unique. When
an athlete is considered unique, there will be neither an available market to purchase a player of equivalent talent, nor ascertainable damages. 21 The initial sports cases manifested the
principle that injunctive relief was an extraordinary remedy.
These courts applied to uniqueness a dictionary meaning of "one
and only" or "different from all others," 22 so that only where
it was "impossible to replace the player, '23 would the court de24
clare that uniqueness was present.
The harsh test of impossibility of replacement was modified
in 1902 by the Philadelphia Baseball Club v. Lajoie25 decision.
Napolean Lajoie, a second baseman playing in the National
League, "jumped" to the newly formed American League when
offered more money for his services. The trial court denied the
injunctive relief sought by the club because it failed to show
that it would be "impossible to replace the player ....
,,26 On
20.

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 380(2) (1932).

21. Scheffler, Injunctions in Professional Athletes' Contracts-an
Overused Remedy, 43 CONN. B.J. 538, 542 (1969); J. POMEROY, SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS 76, § 24 (3d ed. 1926).

22. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (college ed. 1968).
23. Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 215, 51 A. 973
(1902).
24. See Allegheny Baseball Club v. Bennett, 14 F. 257 (W.D. Pa.
1882) (another player could be obtained at a higher price to replace the
breaching athlete); Columbus Baseball Club v. Reiley, 11 Ohio Dec. 272
(1891) (athlete held not unique because the court feared that to hold
otherwise would result in all athletes being deemed unique).
25. 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
26. Id. at 215, 51 A. at 973.
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appeal, this decision was reversed, with the court stating that to
deny relief unless there was a showing that it would be impossible
to replace Lajoie "has taken extreme ground. '27 Judge Potter,
speaking for the court, set forth Pomeroy's 28 test as the applicable
standard by which uniqueness should be measured: where "the
same service could not easily be obtained from others,' ' -9 the
service is declared unique. In applying this test, Lajoie was said
to be an
expert baseball player in any position; . . . [he had] great reputation as a second baseman; . . . [and] his place would be hard
to fill with as good a player; . . . and [his loss] would probably
make a difference in the size of the audiences attending the
game. 30
Thus, although Lajoie was not "the sun in the baseball firmament, . . . he is certainly a bright particular star."'31
Two cases immediately followed which applied the Lajoie
32
test, but injunctive relief was denied.
According to the test propounded by the court in Lajoie,
a player's uniqueness is to be tested by how easily a replacement can be obtained. But this test is premised upon the theory that only a player possessing special skill, knowledge or
ability is irreplaceable. Therefore, it is only the combination of
replacement and the quantum of special skill that forms the
Lajoie rule.
While the Lajoie test eliminated the impossibility of replacement test, it permitted subsequent courts great latitude for interpretation and application. What appears to be the result of
this grant of interpretive flexibility is that subsequent courts, in
attempting to apply this vague test and formulate some logical
reasoning and common standards, have emasculated the Lajoie
test into a presumption that any athlete who has signed a pro33
fessional standard player contract is unique.
27. Id. at 216, 51 A. at 973.

28. J. POMEROY,

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTs

76 (3d ed. 1926).

29. 202 Pa. 210, 216, 51 A. 973.
30. Id. at 217, 51 A. at 974.
31. Id.
32. In the first case, Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116 F. 782
(E.D. Pa. 1902), the court held that
the evidence adduced is by no means conclusive upon the question
whether the services which the defendant contracted to render were
so unique and peculiar that they could not be performed, and substantially as well, by others engaged in professional baseball playing,
who might easily be obtained to take his place. Id. at 783.
The second case was American Baseball and Athletic Exhibition Co. v.
Harper, 54 Cent. L.J. 449 (Cir. Ct. of St. Louis, May, 1902), where the
court found that a player of limited experience but with outstanding po-

tential could be replaced. It was reasoned that this evidence "did not
tend to show that Harper's services are of a unique character, or that
he has special or peculiar knowledge, skill or ability." Id. at 450.
33. Washington Capitals Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 304 F. Supp.
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The development of this presumption through the varied interpretations and applications of Lajoie is clearly illustrated by
84
the cases of Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett,
Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris,5 Winnipeg Rugby
Football Club v. Freeman,36 and Long Island American Ass'n
7
Football Club v. Manrodt.3
In Barnett, the court had-to determine whether an above
average first year basketball player was unique. The Syracuse
Nationals Basketball Club had the playing rights to Dick Barnett for the 1961-62 season by virtue of the option clause in his
1960-61 contract. Barnett, disregarding the option clause, signed
a contract to play for the newly formed Cleveland Basketball
Club. The court found Barnett to be unique, even though he
was not selected to participate in the East-West All-Star Game,
or chosen as a member of the Basketball Writers All N.B.A.
Team in 1961, and notwithstanding the fact that he had only
been a professional for one year. The court reasoned that:
[W]hether Barnett ranks with the top basketball players or not,
the evidence shows that he is an outstanding professional basketball player of unusual attainments and exceptional skill and ability, and that he is of peculiar and particular value to the plaintiff.38
In applying the Lajoie test, the court concluded that "such players, . . . are not easily replaceable. '3 9 Although it appears that
the Barnett court properly considered both aspects of the Lajoie test, it is submitted that the quantum of skill requirement
was inadequately satisfied.
The court in Harris retreated from the Lajoie test a step
farther when presented with the issue of whether an average
player is unique. The court held that the athlete was unique,
but only because there were no other players of Harris' ability
then available to the club. 40 Thus, the Lajoie test was again
applied without the special skill requirement being satisfied.
The presumption that all professional athletes are unique
was strengthened in the Winnipeg case where the breaching athletes were untested rookies. In determining that these athletes
were unique, the court stated that
1193, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Brennan, Injunction Against Professional
Athletes Breaking Their Contracts, 34 BKLYN. L. REV. 61, 70 (1967).
34. 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506 (C.P. 1961).
35. 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
36. 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
37. 23 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
38. Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130,
137, 181 N.E.2d 506, 514 (C.P. 1961).
39. Id. at 139, 181 N.E.2d at 517.
40. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37, 45
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
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appraisal of skill and unique ability of a player, as they relate
to contracts of this type, must depend somewhat upon his prospects and potential. Otherwise, such a contract with a college
football player seldom would stand up for the professional club
that first signed him.
• . . [Furthermore,] the standard of special skill and exceptional
ability to some extent
must have a relation to the class and
41
character of play.
The court distinguished the class and character of competition
between the competing professional leagues. In conclusion, the
court held that evidence given by the defendant's witness that
the athletes were merely "good" football players in relation to
the class of competition in the more established league was
not sufficient to overcome the persuasive evidence in support of
the plaintiff's claim that these two defendant players, for the
purposes of the plaintiff's Club and the character of the game
in its League, had special skill and exceptional ability for their
respective
positions and were of peculiar value to the Winnipeg
42
Club.
The Manrodt case presented another twist to the Lajoie test.
Does a player become unique, regardless of ability, because of
the peculiar and special problems involved in the organization
of a new football team? 43 As in Harris,the Manrodt court applied the Lajoie test, but only as a test of replacement, and
thus the skill of the player was not considered. The court justified this application by reasoning that new teams have difficulty
in securing players, and as a result, a breaching athlete will
make it overly burdensome for a new team to replace him with
a player of equal ability. This case has the same effect as the
other three-Lajoie has been liberally interpreted so as to diminish its effectiveness as a test for uniqueness.
Today, the original Lajoie formula is meaningless. By almost any conceivable method, a club can now show that a
player is unique. These methods of proof range from showing
actual or potential ability to organizational problems. The present status for player uniqueness was summarized by Professor
Brennan as follows:
[Any] individual who signs a contract as a professional athlete,
whether merely a prospect, a league run player, a better than
average player or 44
a star will be subject to an injunction against
breach of contract.
Case law confirms this observation.

In Nassau Sports v. Pe-

41. Winnipeg Rugby Football Club, Ltd. v. Freeman, 140 F. Supp. 365,
366 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
42. Id. at 366-67.
.... 43: Long Island Am. Ass'n Football Club v. Manrodt, 23 N.Y.S.2d 858,
860 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
44. Brennan, supra note 33.
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ters,45 Judge Neaher stated that "recent decisions

indicate
that the requirement [of uniqueness] is met prima facie in cases
involving professional athletes.

' 46

Confronted with this new standard, the question is whether
the present procedure for testing uniqueness is still in compliance with the equitable philosophy that injunctive relief will
only be granted as an extraordinary remedy? It is submitted
that the obvious answer is no. To so comply, this author believes that the courts must return to the original Lajoie test. A
careful reading of that test shows that the skill requirement
must be satisfied prior to the application of the replacement
test. As has been shown, some courts have been bypassing the
skill requirement and relying solely on the replacement test
to find uniqueness. The presumption that a professional athlete
is unique upon the signing of a standard player contract should
not attach. It is necessary to demonstrate that the player possesses special skill, knowledge or ability which distinguishes
him from other professional athletes. The mere signing of an
athletic contract is not sufficient proof of this fact. Each year
many players are injured and suitable replacements are found.
Year after year rookies sign professional contracts and replace
veterans. It is common knowledge that some players are stars
while others are reserves or merely adequate starters. Should
all players, therefore, be classified unique? Of course not. The
test of special skill should be based on skill. There are techniques
for measuring potential skill (teams utilize such techniques prior
to drafting players) and actual skill (performance charts and
statistics). Consequently, the courts should decide, using these
or any other aids, what level of skill within the ranks of professional athletics is to be deemed unique. Once the courts return
to finding only specially talented athletes unique, the philosophy
of extraordinariness will once again be viable.
Inadequate Remedy at Law

Standing alone, uniqueness appears to be unimportant, but
as a means of ascertaining whether or not damages at law are
adequate, it gains relevancy. The interdependence of the
uniqueness and adequacy at law elements is illustrated in the
statement that where a player is unique, "[t] he damages for the
breach of such contracts cannot be estimated with any certainty
and the employer cannot by means of any damages purchase
the same services in the labor market.
45. 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
46. Id. at 876.

47. J. PoMERoY, supra note 21.

'4 7

These interdepend-
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ent elements serve as the primary jurisdictional prerequisites
set out in Lumley. But with the deterioration of the uniqueness
test into the presumption that all professional athletes are
unique, the test regarding inadequate damages was also eroded.
There are aspects of adequacy which are separate and distinct from uniqueness. In addition to the aforementioned deterioration, the adequacy test has been incorrectly applied, resulting in a collapse of the test as a safeguard for equity jurisdiction. The following investigation of the adequacy of damages at law will focus upon these separate aspects of the failure
of the adequacy test rather than the simultaneous deterioration
of these interdependent elements.
Should the damages which must be shown to be inadequate
at law result from a breach of the affirmative promise or from
a breach of the negative covenant, or is the form of breach immaterial? Dean Pound 48 and Professor Williston 49 insisted
that an injunction should be granted only when the damages
which resulted from the breach of a negative covenant, separate
from the damages which are caused by a breach of the affirmative promise, are inadequately compensable at law. If damages
arising from the positive breach alone, or from the positive and
the negative breaches when considered together, are used to determine that the remedy at law is inadequate, the negative
breach is serving no purpose other than to coerce performance.
Therefore, this would constitute a form of indirect specific performance which a court of equity cannot provide.50
The case of Harrisburg Baseball Club v. Athletic Association
exemplifies this theory. The athlete refused to play
for the plaintiff-club and intended to play for a rival team. The
plaintiff's alleged injury was loss of receipts caused by the loss
of the player's services. However, the complaint failed to allege
that the club would be injured if the defendant played for the
rival team. Since there were no damages caused by the breach
of the negative covenant, injunctive relief was denied. If the
injunction had been granted, the court noted that this would
have been an attempt to remedy the positive breach indirectly
by injunction.
5

Dean Stevens, agreeing with Pound and Williston, defined
the inadequacy of the damages resulting from the negative
48. Pound, The Progress Of The Law, 1918-1919 Equity, 33 HARV. L.
REv. 420, 438-40 (1919-20).
49.

5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1450 (rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT OF

CONTRACTS § 380 (1) (a) (1932) (co-authored by Williston).
50. Stevens, supra note 17, at 263-70.
51. 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 337 (1890).
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breach as the added injury to the club. 52 Stevens then went
a step farther and described under what circumstances the
breached negative covenant would result in added injury. His
theory was that only when the athlete performed for a rival
club in direct competition with the team with which he initially
5 3
contracted could the damages at law possibly be inadequate.
Professor Williston 54 and commentators writing in related
fields, such as entertainment, agree with this theory.55 One
of these commentators stated the principle as follows:
[W]here the defendant would appear in some remote part of the
world in such a fashion that there would be no conceivable competitive situation existing between plaintiff and defendant's new
employer, it would appear that there would be no independent
value to plaintiff from the enforcement of the defendant's negative undertaking5 6
The case of DePol v. Sohlke57 is an application of this theory. In DePol, the court refused to enjoin the defendant-danseuse when she attempted to perform for another. The court
reasoned that since the defendant would be performing in an
area where the plaintiff did not have his business, there would
be no direct competition and thus the plaintiff could not be
injured by the breach of the negative covenant. Therefore,
since the only injury would be diminution of revenue resulting
from the loss of the defendant's services, the court could not
award injunctive relief because this would have constituted indirect specific performance of the affirmative covenant.
Although these venerable scholars and a few courts believe
that the Lumley inadequacy standard should be interpreted and
applied only in this fashion, the majority of courts appear to hold
otherwise. These courts held that the mere breach of the affirmative promise is the only allegation needed to show irreparable injury.5 8 Moreover, they do not even investigate whether
the damages which resulted from the negative breach are inadequate.
Typical of this judicial myopia is the case of Nassau Sports
v. Hampson.59 The court found that the damage to the club
would be irreparable, based exclusively on the athlete's refusal
52. Stevens, supra note 17, at 263-70.
53. Id.
54. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS'§ 1450 (rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT OF

CONTRACTS § 380(1) (a) (1932).

55. Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts in the
Entertainment Industry, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 18, 20 (1954).
56. Id.
57. 30 N.Y. Supr. (7 Robt.) 280 (1867).
58. Irreparable injury is used interchangeably by courts with a remedy which is inadequate at law. See, e.g., Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352
F. Supp. 870, 882 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).

59. 355 F. Supp. 733 (Minn. 1972).
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to play for them, without any allegation of harm stemming
from his playing for another club. It was held "that the defendant Hampson is a skilled professional hockey player, . . . [and
the] plaintiff has lost the unique services of Hampson and that
such loss represents irreparable injury." 60 In Boston Professional Hockey Association, Inc. v. Cheevers,6 ' even though the
district court found no irreparable harm, although reversed on
appeal, the court looked only to see whether the affirmative
breach would cause irreparable harm: "I find and rule that
there has been no showing that the loss of services of Cheevers
and Sanderson will cause irreparable harm to the financial affairs and fortunes of the plaintiff. '62 And in Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry,63 an inadequate remedy at
law was said to exist "when an athletic team is denied the serv'64
ices of an irreplaceable athlete.
In these situations, the courts are achieving exactly what the
Lumley court stated that it was prohibited from doing-compelling indirect specific performance of an affirmative breach. 65
Therefore, it can be argued that the application of the inadequacy test in most sports cases has been invalid.
In summary, inadequacy, as it is applied by the courts today, fails as a jurisdictional safeguard. First, due to the collapse
of the uniqueness test, a correlative deterioration of the adequacy
test has occurred. Second, the courts are misapplying Lumley
when they consider damages other than those arising from the
breach of the negative covenant. Third, the courts, by this misapplication, have not used the direct competition test set forth
by Stevens, Pound and Williston.
POST ELEMENT INQUIRY

After a court completes its investigation into whether the
Lumley elements are satisfied in order to establish jurisdiction,
the inquiry then focuses upon the discretionary aspects of
granting injunctive relief. Today, a court of equity will assume
jurisdiction in any sports case as a result of the court's failure
to apply the uniqueness and inadequacy requirements properly.
Therefore, the defenses which the athlete can raise to prevent
the injunction from issuing gain added importance. The defenses which breaching athletes have raised most frequently
and successfully are mutuality of remedy, unclean hands, per60. Id. at 736.

61. 348 F. Supp. 261 (Mass. 1972).

62. Id. at 269.
63. 304 F. Sunp. 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
64. Id. at 1197.

65. 1 De G. M. & G. 604, 609 (1852).
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petual services, reasonableness, and economic harshness. An examination of each of these defenses will illustrate the situations
in which they may be asserted successfully.
Mutuality of Remedy

The defense raised most often in opposition to injunctive
relief is mutuality of remedy. A negative covenant in a contract will not be specifically enforced by injunction where there
is a want of mutuality of remedy. Such a situation will exist
if a contractual provision gives the club the right to terminate
the contract after giving the player ten days notice.6 6 Most
courts 7 which have permitted this defense were shocked by
the fact that the contract could bind the athlete for a number
of years while the club could end all contractual obligations
within ten days.68
Further, the courts dislike the fact that
even if they grant injunctive relief, the club could subsequently make the decree a nullity by terminating the contract.6 9
There appear to be two reasons which suggest that this defense is an anachronism. First, most standard player contracts
have been modified to allow the club to terminate the contract
only for cause. In addition, the player is also given the right to
terminate the contract for limited reasons.7 0 The second rea-

66. The Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Johnson, 190 Ill. App. 630 (1914).

67. See ,e.g., Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich. 1914); Allegheny Baseball Club v. Bennett, 14 F. 257 (W.D. Pa. 1882); Brooklyn
American Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. Rep. 441, 149
N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914); Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 24 Abb.
N. Cas. 393, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890); The Cincinnati Exhibition Co.
v. Johnson, 190 Ill. App. 630 (1914); Am. Baseball Club and Athletic Exhibition Co. v. Harper, 54 Cent. L.J. 449 (Cir. Ct. of St. Louis 1902); Philadelphia Ball Club v. Hallman, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 57 (Ct. of Common Pleas
1890).
68. Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 24 Abb. N. Cas. 393, 412 9
N.Y.S. 779, 781 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
69. Id.
70. Typical of the new termination clauses is the type used in baseball's standard player contract, which provides in part as follows:
TERMINATION
By Player
7. (a) The Player may terminate this contract upon written notice
to the Club, if the Club shall default in the payments to the Player
provided for in paragraph 2 hereof or shall fail to perform any other
obligation agreed to be performed by the Club hereunder and if the
Club shall fail to remedy such default within ten (10) days after
the receipt by the Club of written notice of such default. The Player
may also terminate this contract as provided in subparagraph (g) (4)
of this paragraph 7.
By Player
7. (b) The Club may terminate this contract upon written notice to
the Player (but only after requesting and obtaining waivers of this
contract from all other Major League Clubs) if the Player shall at
any time:
(1) fail, refuse or neglect to conform his personal conduct to the
standards of good citizenship and good sportsmanship or to keep
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son concerns the courts' new attitude toward mutuality.

No

71
longer do both parties need to have the same exact remedies.
This idea was expressed as early as Lajoie, where the court
stated that a unilateral termination right did not constitute a
lack of mutuality of remedy.

We are not persuaded that the terms of this contract manifest
any lack of mutuality in remedy. Each party has the possibility
of enforcing all the rights stipulated for in the agreement ...
mere difference in rights stipulated for does not destroy mutuality of remedy. Freedom of contract covers a wide range of
obligation and duty as between the parties, and it may not be
impaired, so long as72the bounds of reasonableness and fairness
are not transgressed.
The courts which have applied this principle appear to have reasoned that if there is adequate consideration given for the uni73
Section 372 (1) of
lateral termination right, mutuality exists.
in toto by proLajoie
accepted
has
the Restatement of Contracts
is not
enforcement
of
specific
remedy
viding: "The fact that the
it to
for
refusing
reason
available to one party is not a sufficient
directly
the other party." Furthermore, section 376 is almost
applicable to sports contracts:
Specific enforcement will not be denied in favor of a party
merely because he has a power to terminate the contractual obligation unless the power can be used in spite of the decree in
such a way as to deprive the defendant of the agreed exchange
for his performance.
But there is disagreement as to whether the Lajoie definition of mutuality is the prevalent attitude today. Professors
Chafee and Re state that the Lajoie rule is not the majority
view. 74 Case law lends support to this view. In Connecticut
Professional Sports Corp. v. Heyman,75 the court used the old
concept of mutuality as an important part of its balancing test
himself in first-class physical condition or to obey the Club's training
rules; or
(2) fail, in the opinion of the Club's management, to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to qualify or continue as a member
of the Club's team; or
(3) fail, refuse or neglect to render his services hereunder or
in any other manner materially breach this contract.
71. 202 Pa. 210, 219, 51 A. 973, 974 (1902).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsam, 216 F. 269 (E.D.
Mo. 1914); Long Island Am. Ass'n Football Club v. Manrodt, 23 N.Y.S.
2d 858 (1940); Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio
Op. 2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506 (C.P. 1961). See also 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1202 (1964); Comment, Equity: Specific Performance of Service
Contracts, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 84 (1952); Comment, Enforcement by Injunction of Contractsfor Personal Service, 3 TEMP. L.Q. 431, 432 (1929).
74. CHAFEE & RE, EQUITY, 689 at n.23 (5th ed. 1967).
75. 276 F. Supo. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See, Nassau Sports v. Peters,
352 F. Supp. 870, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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to deny an injunction. Thus, an athlete and his attorney
should be aware of mutuality as a defense.
Unclean Hands
The maxim, that he who comes into equity must have clean
hands, has been used as an equitable defense to prevent the
club from enjoining the player. 70 In the world of sports, such
a defense could be set forth in a case with the following factual situation. A player, who is under contract, is contacted by
another team that knows he is still under contract with the
original team. The player is then induced into signing a contract and playing for the second team before his contract rights
with the first team have terminated. 77 The player then
breaches this new agreement and renews his contract with the
original club for an extended period. The second club seeks
injunctive relief which is denied due to its unclean hands. The
determinative factor in such a case is whether the player's contract to play for the second club is to take effect before or after
his contract with the first club has expired. The clean hands
doctrine would not apply where the second club had contacted
the player while he was still under contract with the first club,
but did not desire the player's services until after the expiration
of the first contract.78 Today, this defense will probably not be
applicable very often since most clubs will sign players to future
service contracts in order to avoid the unclean hands defense.
But if a club wants the player's services immediately and the
player decides to re-sign with his former club, the defense could
be used, even if the club believes that the original contract is
void. This was the situation in Minnesota Muskies Basketball
Club, Inc. v. Hudson.79 The Muskies believed that Hudson would
be free to play for them during the option year of his contract
with the St. Louis Hawks because the option clause could be construed as requiring perpetual services. Hudson, instead of playing for the Muskies, re-signed with the Hawks. The court denied
the injunction based on the unclean hands defense.
Even if the 'reserve clause' in the St. Louis contract is of doubt-

ful validity, the fact remains that the Muskies, knowing that
Hudson was under a moral, if not a legal, obligation to furnish
his services to St. Louis for 1967-68 and subsequent seasons, if
76. New York Giants Football Club, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers
Football Club, Inc., 291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961).
77. See, e.g., The Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (4th
Cir. 1972); Washington Capitals Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d
472 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Minnesota Muskies Basketball Club, Inc. v. Hudson,
294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969).

78. The Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972).
79. 294 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
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St. Louis chose to exercise its option, sent for Hudson and induced
him to repudiate his obligation to St. Louis. Such conduct, even
if strictly within the law because of the St. Louis contract being
unenforceable, was so tainted with unfairness and injustice as to
justify a court of equity in withholding relief.8 0
PerpetualServices
The perpetual services defense will arise when the renewal
or option clause8 ' is construed as being incorporated into the
renewed contract. If the "renewed contract also continued the
option of the club perpetually to retain the services of a ballplayer by continuing to exercise its option each year,"8 2 the
clause should be held unenforceable.8 3 The problem is one of
interpretation and construction.
In Philadelphia Ball Club v. Hallman,8 4 a perpetual service
defense was asserted, and the court, in agreeing, denied the injunction. In interpreting the option clause, the court believed
that the only logical meaning of this clause was that all the
terms of the original contract would be a part of the renewal
contract, thereby giving the club the right to renew ad infinitum. But this same clause was interpreted as not being one for
perpetual services in Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing.8 5
In Barnett, an Ohio court announced the rule of construction
that if an option clause is susceptible of both a valid and an
invalid interpretation, the court should choose the valid one.8 6
Hence, the option clause was considered to give the club the
playing rights to the defendant for only one additional year, and
the renewed contract contained no renewal clause.
80. Id. at 990.
81. The following is the option clause used in professional baseball
contracts:
On or before December 20 (or if a Sunday, then the next preceding
business day) in the year of the last playing season covered by this
contract, the Club may tender to the Player a contract for the term
of that year by mailing the same to the Player at his address following his signature hereto, or if none be given, then at his last address
of record with the Club. If prior to the March 1 next succeeding
said December 20, the Player and the Club have not agreed upon
the terms of such contract, then on or before 10 days after said March
1, the Club shall have the right by written notice to the Player at
said address to renew this contract for the period of one year on
the same terms, except that the amount payable to the Player shall
be such as the Club shall fix in said notice; provided, however, that
said amount, if fixed by a Major League Club, shall be an amount
payable at a rate not less than 80% of the rate stipulated for the
next preceding year and at a rate not less than 70% of the rate stipulated for the year immediately prior to the next preceding season.
82. Scheffler, supra note 21, at 543.
83. Philadelphia Ball Club v. Hallman, 8 Pa. Ct. 57 (Ct. of Common
Pleas 1890).
84. 8 Pa. Ct. 57 (Ct. of Common Pleas 1890).
85. 42 F. 198 (C.C.N.Y. 1890).
86. 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 133, 181 N.E.2d 506, 509-10 (C.P. 1961). See
text accompanying notes 38 and 39 supra.
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The safest and easiest way to avoid a perpetual service situation is by proper draftsmanship. In Harris,the crucial part of
the option clause reads: "[A]fter such renewal this contract
shall not include a further option to the Club to renew the
contract .".,87
With the court's construction favoring validity, it would be
difficult to imagine any court construing an option clause as
possibly requiring perpetual services. Moreover, why would
a club risk an adverse interpretation by a court by not expressly stating that perpetual services are not required by the
contract? But in professional hockey and baseball, such interpretations are possible.
In Hampson, the court construed the option clause in the
professional hockey contract to be one for perpetual services.
"There is apparent to the court no reason why Clause 17 [the
option clause] can be considered anything but a requirement of
perpetual contracting for succeeding one year periods."88 Regarding baseball, it was recently announced that Bob Tolan was
contesting the option clause in an arbitration hearing as being
one for perpetual services.8 9 Both hockey clubs and baseball
clubs are, therefore, still plagued with the possibility that their
option clauses will be held unenforceable. These sports should
heed Professor Brennan's warning that an injunctioin will not
be granted if the renewal clause entitles the club to a future
renewal option in the renewed contract. 90
Reasonableness
Where a court finds that a negative covenant is too broad in
either time or area, it may refuse to enforce the negative covenant.9 ' In Machen v. Johansson,92 the court said that a negative covenant which would prevent Johansson from fighting
anyone in the United States or Floyd Patterson anywhere in
the world, until Johansson fought Machen in a rematch, was unreasonable. A controlling factor in this decision was that this
covenant would have continued after the affirmative promise
had been fulfilled. The court did not decide whether the negative covenant was reasonable during the period that the affirmative promise existed. Most likely it would have been reasonable.
87. 348 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Tex. 1961).
supra.

See text accompanying note 40

88. 355 F. Supp. 733, 735 (Minn. 1972).

59 and 60 supra.

See text accompanying notes

89. Chicago Sun Times, Oct. 24, 1974, at 140, col. 1.
90. Brennan, supra note 33, at 71.

91. Machen v. Johansson, 174 F. Supp. 522, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
92. Id.
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It would appear that the negative covenant in a team sport
contract will always meet this reasonableness test inasmuch as
it is only enforced for as long as the affirmative promise is supposed to last. But in individual sports, for example boxing
where rematches are important, such defenses can be used in
the appropriate cases.
Economic Harshness
Section 380(2) of the Restatement of Contracts has adopted
the position that an injunction will not be enforced when "the
injunction will leave the employee without other reasonable
means of making a living. . .

."

Where a true showing of eco-

nomic hardship can be demonstrated, injunctive relief may be
denied.
In Machen, an alternative ground for denying the injunction was the irreparable harm which would befall the defendant. An injunction would have prevented the defendant from
earning a living as a fighter and would have provided only a
slight benefit to the plaintiff.93 The court noted that an athlete in Johansson's chosen profession only has a few high earning years, and to enjoin him during that period would cause an
undue hardship upon him.
The same rationale was applied in another boxing case. In
9 4
Arena Athletic Club v. McPartland,
the court reasoned that

if the plaintiff had the right to enjoin the defendant from
fighting until they mutually agreed to another date for the exhibition, the plaintiff might arbitrarily refuse to agree and this
refusal would indefinitely deprive the defendant from earning
a living.9 5
Although these arguments may be persuasive in boxing or
other individual sport cases, it does not appear that a defendant
in a team sport will suffer economic hardship in similar situations because the player's future employer will probably pay
him during the period of injunction.
In Munchak Corp v. Cunningham,96 the Carolina Cougars
sought the services of Billy Cunningham who was under contract
with another club. The Cougars agreed to pay Cunningham the
full $80,000 salary he was to receive from his present employers
if he would sit out the option year of his contract. Likewise,
in Cheevers, Derek Sanderson's future employer contracted "to
pay him his full salary for the first two years even if he is en93. Id. at 531.

94. 41 App. Div. 352, 58 N.Y.S. 477 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
95. Id. at 353, 58 N.Y.S. at 478.
96. 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972).
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joined by court decree from playing with the Blazers.19 7

Inas-

much as these players will receive compensation during the injunctive period, they would be constrained to show economic
hardship.
CONCLUSION

Although on a rare occasion a discretionary defense will
arise which can prevent an injunction from issuing, usually the
sports club owner appears to have little, if any, problem in obtaining such relief. The secondary discretionary defenses do not
fill the gaps created by the courts' dilution of the jurisdictional
safeguards. Hence, injunctive relief in these cases has become
an ordinary remedy rather than the extraordinary one which it
was intended to be. This result alone should be grounds for
denying such relief, but there are other reasons.
For instance, even in a case where an injunction should
be granted, it is doubtful that this remedy is really protecting
the plaintiff's interest. A club is in business to make money.
The injunction, when issued under the proper circumstances,
will only prevent the plaintiff from losing money as a result of
the athlete playing on another team which is in direct competition with the plaintiff. The injunction will only last for one
year since most breaches occur during the option year. Thereafter, all those customers who would rather see the defendant
play than watch the plaintiff's team, will then desert the plaintiff. So, by enjoining the defendant for one year, the plaintiff
has prevented only a short term financial loss, but has not prevented the larger loss which will follow after the short term injunction expires. Courts of equity should be hesitant to give relief for such a short period when the damage it is preventing is
inconsequential compared to the damage which will occur upon
the natural termination of the injunction.
Another point against injunctive relief is that it does not
appear that the clubs are seeking it to remedy this minor loss,
but rather they are using it to prevent the loss which is suffered from the affirmative breach. Theoretically, this injunction should not be given to remedy such a breach, for this would
be an attempt to get indirect specific performance, which would
be an act of involuntary servitude. But, if it was for this purpose, the injunction does not appear to be working, for most
players when enjoined sit out the option year.
Still another, reason is that the injunction appears to be is97. 348 F. Supp. 261, 264 (Mass. 1972).
61 and 62 supra.

See text accompanying notes
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suing not to remedy any loss nor to coerce indirect specific performance, but to punish the breaching player by not allowing
him to benefit from his breach.
But as was shown in
Cheevers and Cunningham, the player benefits anyway. 8 And
the loss of one year's playing time will not decrease the ability
of a true star, as Rick Barry and Muhammad Ali have demonstrated with their successful comebacks after layoffs from competition. Therefore, the club is only delighting in a mere reprimand, and not protecting any interest which needs to be
guarded.
The last major reason why relief should be denied is because the player is losing his liberty. What liberty? It is the
liberty to break a contract and to pay money damages as a result. One reason why a person cannot be ordered to specifically perform a personal service contract is that it is involuntary servitude, which is a form of infringement upon personal
liberty. It is submitted that being ordered not to perform for
another is just as much an infringement upon personal liberty.
Why then do the courts still continue to order injunctions
when it is not serving true to the principles of equity, nor protecting the plaintiff's interests or those of the defendant? Because
the law labels the sports business special. The district court in
New York reflected upon this by saying that such relief is necessary because of
the widespread recognition of the unique character of the business of professional sports and the need for some form of protective system to insure the recoupment of investments-often
large-made both to develop and to acquire talented players. 9
It is submitted that this belief is misfounded. The industry will not collapse due to breaching players performing for
other teams, or it would have fallen already, inasmuch as the
breaching players perform for other teams after the injunction
ends.
A possible solution to this problem would be to put a liquidated damages clause, which is expressly intended as the sole
remedy for a breached negative covenant, within the contract.
Then courts of equity will not have to make a mockery of their
jurisdiction by misapplying the Lumley and Lajoie rules, the
plaintiff will receive his lost revenue (which is all he is ultimately
after and all that he deserves) and the defendant will have
the freedom to break a contract if he so desires. By fixing the
liquidated damages, as to each player, at an amount which is a
reasonable estimation of the loss to the club in case of a breach,
98. See text accompanying notes 96 and 97 supra.
99. 352 F. Supp. 870, 879 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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it would provide a sufficient deterrent against indiscriminate
breaching of athletic contracts. Furthermore, the courts would
not find it necessary to unreasonably expand their jurisdiction
as is now occurring when injunctive relief is granted.
Fred Kaplan

